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COMMENT
RODRIGUE v. RODRIGUE:
ANOTHER COPYRIGHT AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY CASE WORTH-Y OF CONTROVERSY
Joseph P. Reid*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Harmonization of [copyright and community property] goals is
properly the product of legislative deliberation and compromise."1
With these words in its recent Rodrigue v. Rodrigue decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana sent yet an-
other signal to Congress regarding the perilous conflict between copy-
right and community property law.
The issue of how copyrights created during marriage should be
treated upon divorce in community property states was first raised in
1987 by In re Marriage of Worth, which held that copyrights were part of
a married couple's community property.2 Almost immediately, com-
mentators in the two disciplines staunchly disagreed as to the merits
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2000; M.S., University of
California, Davis 1997; B.S., Duke University 1995. This Comment was originally
written for the Trade Regulation class at Notre Dame Law School, and an earlier
version of the Comment won second prize in the 1999 Nathan Burkan Competition
organized by ASCAP.
Special thanks go to Professor Joseph Bauer for his help and advice with the
manuscript and to Editor in ChiefJonathan Bridges for tolerating my penchant for
publishing. Also, while I am grateful, as always, for the support and love of my wife,
family, and friends, this Comment is especially for my mother, the consummate (and
sometimes consumed) artist.
1 Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (E.D. La. 1999).
2 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987). Note that although this was the first judicial treat-
ment of the issue, scholars had raised similar questions before Worth arose. See, e.g.,
William Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BuLL.
CoPp. Soc'y USA 237 (1981).
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of Worth. Intellectual property writers, concerned about the conflicts
and confusion which could arise if two people were simultaneously
vested with exclusive rights in a work, denounced Worth as a case
whose practical implications would undermine copyright law's funda-
mental policy goals.3 Meanwhile, family and property law scholars
found Worth to be a correctly decided case, whose result was obvious.4
Caught between these two extremes, authorities in both the courts
and academia have begged for a legislative solution to this problem.5
Unfortunately, no such redress has come, and now Rodrigue has
muddied the waters even further. Although the Rodrigue court
weighed Worth's holding and rationale, it did not agree that copyrights
were community property. However, the court's decision did not rest
on Worth's practical implications, either. Instead, the Rodrigue court
found Louisiana community property law preempted by § 301 of the
1976 Copyright Act.6
This Comment examines the district court's Rodrigue opinion and
discusses its implications for the future of the copyright versus com-
munity property struggle. Part II briefly describes the different sets of
law involved in such a discussion, paying particular attention to the
policy goals of each substantive area. Part III recaps the Worth deci-
sion, and the commentary that has followed it, so that Part IV can
examine how the Rodrigue court came to a conclusion opposite that of
Worth. Part V concludes the Comment by suggesting that although
the analysis employed in Rodrigue was more even-handed and thought-
3 See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-
Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 382 (1990); Debora Polacheck, The
"Un-Worthy" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HAS-
TINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copy-
right as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
4 This confidence is indicated by the inclusion of the case in texts for those
subjects. See, e.g., GAIL B. BIRD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNrrY
PROPERTY (6th ed. 1994); WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., COMMutrY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA
(2d ed. 1988).
5 See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 6A.04, at 6-26 n.1 (1998) ("Obviously the best solution to this conundrum would be
to enact new laws.") [hereinafter NiMMER ON COPYRIG-rr); David Nimmer, Copyright
Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. REv. 383, 411, 415
(1988) (mentioning twice that alternative solutions are necessary only "absent legisla-
tive redress of the discrepancies" between copyright and community property laws);
PeterJ. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHo L.
REV. 1087, 1090 (1995) (noting that other solutions are important because "Congress
has not resolved this conflict").
6 See Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 540 ("On its face, § 301 does not expressly pre-
empt community property law .... [H]owever, there are specific areas of potential
conflict between the [two sets of law] ... that result in preemption.").
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ful than Worth, it still provides no clear answer to the copyright versus
community property debate, and thus stands as another sign that leg-
islative resolution is required.
II. RELEVANT LAW
A. Copyright Law
The right of authors to copyright their works is drawn directly
from the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings."7 Using this power, Congress first afforded copyright protection
in 17908 and most recently revamped the copyright scheme in 1976. 9
The twin goals of copyright law are purposely conflicting: (1) to
encourage creative development, while (2) simultaneously ensuring
access to the work for the public good.'0 Copyright achieves creative
stimulation by rewarding authors and artists with a bundle of exclusive
rights in their own work. These rights give creators power and con-
trol, so that they can benefit financially from their products and pre-
vent misuse by others through judicial remedies. However, copyright
also maintains public access by limiting the time period of the exclu-
sive rights and by allowing for "fair use" and other uses in certain
circumstances."
As with previous copyright legislation, the 1976 Copyright Act
(1976 Act) 12 grants protection to "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression."' 3 At the time of the work's
creation, the author is invested with the bundle of "exclusive rights"
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
9 See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1994)).
10 The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed copyright's twin goals and the
balance they create. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) ("[A]Ithough dissemi-
nation of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance
between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright protec-
tion and the public's need for access to creative works."); Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (noting that the granting of exclusive rights for a
limited term "is intended to motivate creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired").
11 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-20 (1994).
12 Id. §§ 101-810, 1001-10.
13 Id. § 102.
2000]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
enumerated in § 106.14 Furthermore, under § 201, ownership of the
copyright vests in the author,15 who is then free to transfer ownership
"in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or operation of
law."1 6 The one restriction on ownership transfer is found in
§ 201 (e), which prevents involuntary transfers by "action [of] any gov-
ernmental body or other official or organization."17 Co-ownership of
a copyright is permissible under the statute in several situationsI8 and
consists essentially of a tenancy in common. 19
In an attempt to unify and clarify copyright law, which had been
ruled by both federal and state protection systems, the 1976 Act also
included § 301, which preempts the assertion of "all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights" granted to
authors under § 106 for copyrightable materials. 20 This has had par-
ticularly significant effects on some state causes of action,2' as preemp-
tion can only be escaped if the right in question contains a so-called
"extra element" to distinguish it from federal copyright.22
14 See id. § 106. These rights include reproduction, the preparation of derivative
works, distribution to the public, performance, and display. See id.
15 See id. § 201(a). The exception to this general scheme comes with so-called
'works-for-hire." Under the work-for-hire doctrine, an employer for whom a copy-
rightable work is made is considered to be the author and thus receives the instanta-
neous vesting of rights described in § 201, unless the parties have expressly agreed in
writing to the contrary prior to the work's creation. See id. § 201(b).
16 Id. § 201(d).
17 Id. § 201(e).
18 Section 201 permits co-ownership where the work is ajoint work, i.e. where "a
work is prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id. § 101.
Nimmer enumerates other situations which would result in co-ownership. See 1 NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, § 6.01, at 6-3 to -4.
19 In this way, each of the owners may transfer his interest in the copyright with-
out consent but can only transfer the interest of the co-owner with consent. See id.
§ 6.11, at 6-34. Furthermore, each co-owner may nonexclusively license the copy-
righted work with a duty to account for half of the profits to the other, but no duty to
inform the other. See id. § 6A.02[C], at 6A-12.
20 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
21 One particularly controversial example is the "right of publicity," a particular
form of the broader "right to privacy," which entitles people to control the uses of
their likenesses by granting them a cause of action against tortfeasors who use their
names or likeness without consent to gain some pecuniary advantage. For a detailed
treatment of the right of publicity preemption controversy, see Sean Elliott, Dancing
Promotions, Dodging Preemption, and Defending Personas: Why Preempting the Right of Public-
ity Deprives Talent the Publicity Protection They Deserve, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1625
(1998).
22 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1983), reu'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) ("Conversely, when a state law viola-
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B. Community Property Law
Community property law, which draws its roots from the Euro-
pean civil law tradition, is a system embraced by several states23 where
the married couple is examined as a unit, instead of as two individu-
als.24 This policy presumes that the husband and wife are equal, and
that the marital unit is worthy of special legal recognition.25
In such a regime, property that comes into the marriage can be
designated as either "community" property or "separate" property.
Much like partners in a business partnership, each of the spouses has
an equal, undivided interest in the marital property, whereas the sepa-
rate property belongs to only one of the two individuals.26 Thus, sepa-
rate property can be disposed of by the owning spouse as if he or she
were single.27 Although traditionally the husband was thought to
manage the community property, this assumption has loosened to the
point where the rule is that both spouses enjoy managerial and dispo-
sitional power.28 However, some exceptions remain for certain kinds
of transfers29 and special situations, 0 and several states have added so-
called "business exceptions," whereby one spouse can individually
manage a community property business within certain bounds. 31
tion is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or
the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.").
23 Currently, nine states have community property systems, including Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. Although these nine systems are similar in principle, they are not completely
identical. See, e.g., 1 NIMmER ON COiI-GHT, supra note 5, § 6A.02 [A] [2], at 6A-5 to -6;
Nimmer, supra note 5, at 388-89. In the past many sources have concentrated solely
on California community property law because of the state's size, influence, and the
Worth opinion, reasoning that "although the other... [community property] states
have not yet confronted the issue, the same result would seem likely under their laws."
1 NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, § 6A.02[A] [2], at 6A-8 n.26. Given that Ro-
drigue is a Louisiana case, such a simplification is no longer possible.
24 See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.14, at 240 (1984).
25 See id.
26 See id. § 5.15, at 242-43.
27 See id. § 5.16, at 248.
28 See id. § 5.16, at 249; see also Wong, supra note 5, at 1095-96; Roberts, supra
note 3, at 1059-60.
29 For example, transfers of real property held by the marital community require
the consent of both spouses. See id.
30 As mentioned in note 37, infra, one situation in which the community property
presumption is overcome is during times of separation.
31 See, e.g., CAL. FAm. CODE § 1100(d) (West 1994).
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C. Preemption Law
In general, federal law preempts state law in areas of conflict be-
cause of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.3 2 In matters of
family law, however, federal courts are extremely deferential to state
law; in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,33 the Supreme Court established a spe-
cial two-pronged test to determine whether preemption should apply
in family-related cases. Under Hisquierdo, a court considering preemp-
tion must first examine the nature of the discrepancy between federal
and state law. To achieve the proper level of deference in family
cases, Hisquierdo dictates that preemption is only proper if there is an
"express conflict" between federal and state family law.34 That is, Con-
gress must have "positively required [preemption] by direct enact-
ment... [because a] mere conflict in words is not sufficient."3 5 Once
an express conflict is found, the court must then analyze its severity;
preemption is deemed proper under Hisquierdo if the express conflict
between the two laws does "major damage" to "clear and substantial"
federal interests.3 6
III. IN RE M&ARAG06 OF WORTH
A. The Decision
1. Facts
Frederick Worth was an author who completed several books dur-
ing his marriage to his wife, Susan; two of these were books of trivia,
published in 1977 and 1981. 3 7 In 1982, Frederick and Susan Worth
32 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the ... Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
33 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Jess Hisquierdo, a railroad worker, was going to be enti-
tled to benefits under the federal Railroad Retirement Act upon turning 60. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 3201-33 (1994); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 807. During divorce proceedings,
his wife, Angela Hisquierdo, contended that under California community property
law, she was entitled to half of the benefits Jess had earned during their marriage
(about 20% of the total benefits he would have received). See id. Noting that in simi-
lar federal benefits cases, community property allowances had been specially drafted
into the statutes by Congress, the Court disagreed, holding that to grant Angela a
portion of the benefits would "cause[] the kind of injury to federal interests that the
Supremacy Clause forbids." Id. at 590.
34 See id. at 581.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See In reMarriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 135 (1987). Although Worth's
first book, The Complete Unabridged Super Trivia Encyclopedia, was published before the
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divorced, agreeing as part of the dissolution to evenly split future roy-
alties from the books.38 When Frederick brought a copyright infringe-
ment action against the makers of the board game Trivial Pursuit in
1984,39 Susan claimed she was a co-owner of the copyrights, and
sought ajudicial order entitling her not only to an equal share of the
royalties, but to any other proceeds Frederick received from his in-
fringement claim as well. 40 When the California trial court issued this
order, Frederick appealed.41
2. Holding and Rationale
Frederick Worth made three arguments on appeal: he contended
(1) that because the 1976 Act defines copyright as "vesting initially in
the author,"42 only the author can own a copyright;43 (2) that because
the divorce agreement concerned only the book royalties, it did not
transfer any other substantive rights to his wife, and therefore she had
no claim to the copyrights in question;44 and (3) that California com-
munity property law was preempted implicitly by Hisquierdo and ex-
1976 Act's effective date of January 1, 1978, see FREDERICK WORTH, THE COMPETE
UNABRmGE SUPER TRvLA ENCYCLOPEmA (1977) it became entitled to federal protec-
tion on that date under § 303 of the 1976 Act. Worth's second book, The Complete
Unabridged Super Trivia Encyclopedia, Volume HI, was automatically entitled to federal
protection at the time of its creation under § 302 of the 1976 Act, see FREDERICK
WORTH, THE CoMPLETE UNABRIDGED SUPER TRvivA ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOLUME II (1981)
[hereinafter VOLUME II]. The timing of protection is significant because some au-
thors have suggested that, given the date of their divorce, the Worths were living
separately at the time of Volume H's publication. If the Worths were apart at that time,
California community property law would have characterized Volume i's copyright as
separate property. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 771 (West 1994); Polacheck, supra note 3, at
n.25.
38 See Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
39 Frederick Worth alleged that Selchow & Righter Company, the manufacturers
of the game, had plagiarized information from his books to create Trivial Pursuit's
questions. See, e.g., Lydia Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copright as Community Property
Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 153 (1995). Note that before the decision was handed down
regarding Susan Worth's claims, Frederick Worth lost at both the district court and
appellate court levels. See I Nm mER ON COPYIUGHT, supra note 5, § 6A.02 [A] [3] n.21.
40 See Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Susan Worth was claiming a right to half of all
of the infringement proceeds to be received by Frederick, not just those related to
royalties owed her under the divorce agreement. See id. Thus, this case invoked copy-
right law concepts and was not merely settled as a contractual obligation.
41 See id.
42 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
43 See Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
44 See id. at 138-39.
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pressly by § 301 of the 1976 Act, and thus his wife had no claim to the
copyrights.45 The court rejected each of these arguments in turn.
First, the court examined Frederick's assertion that only he, the
author, could own the copyrights in question. Feeling that this idea
ran afoul of California's "general proposition that all property ac-
quired during the marriage is community property," the court dis-
missed Frederick's role of sole author as not determinative, because
"the principles of community property law do not require joint or
qualitatively equal spousal efforts or contributions."46 Ultimately, the
court found § 201 (d)'s language conclusive, characterizing Califor-
nia's community property statute as transferring copyright ownership
to the spouse "by operation of law"47 after the copyright had "vest[ed]
initially in the author."48 In doing so, the court embraced the legal
fiction that an instantaneous transfer of rights to Susan occurred just
after the initial vesting in Frederick. Using this interpretation, the
court found the conclusion that the copyrights were community prop-
erty to be "inescapable."49
The court dismissed Frederick's second argument regarding the
difference between royalties and substantive rights as "specious."50
While the court agreed with Frederick's proposal that the royalty
agreement did not address Susan's substantive powers, it took this fact
to mean that Susan retained exactly what the community property sys-
tem gave her: an equal right to the two copyrights.5'
Finally, the court held that California's community property law
was neither implicitly nor expressly preempted by federal copyright
law. While Frederick Worth emphasized the similarity between the
federal railroad benefits at issue in Hisquierdo and the rights vested in
authors by federal copyright law, the Worth court disagreed. Although
it did not explicitly perform the two-pronged Hisquierdo analysis, the
court believed that Hisquierdo and its progeny were "readily distin-
guishable" because the benefits in those cases were "defined by Con-
gress to be the separate property of the designated recipient."52 In
contrast, the court found that the 1976 Act specifically allowed for
"co-ownership as well as transfer of all or part of a copyright" through
§ 201, and this flexibility of ownership, in turn, meant that "noth-
45 See id. at 139-40.
46 Id. at 136.
47 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994).
48 Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
49 Id. at 137.
50 Id. at 138.
51 See id. at 138-39.
52 Id. at 139.
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ing... precludes the acquisition of a community property interest by
a spouse."53
With regard to express preemption, the court reasoned that Con-
gress's intent with § 301 was "to supersede only state copyright laws." 54
It then concluded that "[r] ights of ownership and division of marital
property are in no way equivalent to rights within the scope of copy-
right" and thus held that § 301 did not prevent the vesting of copy-
right co-ownership in Susan Worth. 55
B. Commentary
As mentioned earlier, opinions regarding Worth correlate strongly
with the particular author's area of legal expertise. This Part presents
both of the primary viewpoints.
1. Commentary by Intellectual Property Writers
Not surprisingly, intellectual property scholars as a group have
been extremely critical of Worth. This criticism began 56 with David
Nimmer's comprehensive analysis of the case, which raised two basic
objections. First, Nimmer detailed both the inconsistent results that
would occur if copyrights were treated as community propertyS7 and
the logical questions raised by the decision.58 Second, Nimmer con-
tended that the vesting of copyright in an author was exactly analo-
gous to the vesting of the railroad benefits at issue in Hisquierdo; thus,
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 140. The court noted, "State laws granting or protecting other rights
(such as breach of contract, conversion, defamation, etc.) have not been preempted."
Id. at 139-40. At no point, however, did the Worth court perform the extra element
test or formally analyze the community property rights in question.
56 Again, note that Patry's commentary, written before Worth was even heard,
raised similar objections to copyright-community property integration as those ex-
pressed by authors commenting on the Worth case itself. See supra note 2.
57 For most intellectual property scholars, the most troublesome implication of
Worth stems from the ability of the copyright holder to assign or license the work. As
Nimmer discussed at length, co-owners of a copyright are tenants in common, as each
owner may individually license the work nonexclusively without a duty to inform, but
must account to the other for half the profits obtained from the license. Spouses
holding community property are essentially joint tenants, however, and thus each
would be able to exclusively license the work, unless a primary management rule ap-
plies, in which case the spouse with the ability to license the work would have a duty to
inform.
58 Nimmer was especially troubled by two questions: the rights of surviving
spouses and the role of § 201(e) regarding transfers by operation of law. See Nimmer,
supra note 5, at 403-10.
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for Nimmer, federal preemption in the copyright arena should have
been obvious.59 While Nimmer did admit that Worth's logical syllo-
gism was "unassailable,"60 for him the combination of practical impli-
cations and precedent was overwhelming. To solve this predicament,
Nimmer ultimately proposed that California's business exception to
community property could be altered to simultaneously assure the au-
thor spouse's control of the copyright while still protecting the finan-
cial interests of the non-author spouse.61
Several critics followed Nimmer's lead in attacking Worth's practi-
cal implications. Debora Polacheck echoed Nimmer's comments re-
garding Worth,62  forecasting "far reaching effects" for the
entertainment industry, "where performance between parties often
takes place before a contract is written."63 Similarly, Francis Nevins
assailed Worth, but disagreed with Nimmer's proposed solution,64 ar-
guing instead that a careful redrafting of § 201 (e) would solve the
problem. 65
Worth's critics did not focus solely on practicality and logistics,
however. They also raised serious constitutional and preemption ob-
jections to the decision. For example, Polacheck contended that com-
munity property law is both implicitly66 and expressly67 preempted.
Nevins, again, relied on the language of § 201 (e) to make a preemp-
59 See id. at 400.
60 Id. at 391.
61 See id. at 411-15. Nimmer expressed frustration that the original language of
the business exception codified in California Civil Code § 5125(d) (now California
Family Code § 1100(d)) was amended to change "sole management and control" to
"primary management and control." See id. However, Nimmer believed that spousal
consent could be used to overcome even this change in wording and achieve his pur-
pose. See id.
62 See Polacheck, supra note 3, at 626-28.
63 Id. at 628.
64 See Nevins, supra note 3, at 398-400. After suggesting that Nimmer's ideas
about consent "would stand our system of federalism on its head," id. at 400, Nevins
contends that Nimmer's proposal regarding the business exception "has even less to
commend it," id.
65 See id. at 401-06.
66 See, e.g., Polacheck, supra note 3, at 616-20. Polacheck takes particular issue
with the Worth court's dismissal of Hisquierdo and its progeny as distinguishable and
concludes that Worth's approach fails both prongs of the Hisquierdo test.
67 See, e.g., id. at 621-25. Polacheck maintains that the rights at issue in Worth
meet both of § 301's requirements for preemption: she concludes that Worth's books
were the subject matter of copyright, and that the rights at issue were equivalent to
those established by § 106. Polacheck admits, however, that a court applying the ex-
tra element test could find that marriage was an additional element, removing the
Worth situation from § 301. See id. at 624.
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tion argument.68 Some others have even suggested that Worth may
run afoul of the Commerce Clause. 69
2. Commentary by Community Property and Family Law Scholars
In contrast to those in the intellectual property community, prop-
erty and family law scholars have viewed Worth as "unremarkable," be-
cause of its "ground[ing] in one of the most important tenets of the
community property system: the fruits of the labors of either spouse
are the shared property of the marital community. '70 In general, the
commentary that has been written on Worth has taken one or both of
two tacks: (1) trying to improve the Worth rationale regarding preemp-
tion, and (2) attempting to discredit the practical objections of intel-
lectual property writers.
In addressing the preemption arguments in Worth, most agree
that the court could have engaged in a more thorough Hisquierdo
analysis.7 ' Simultaneously, those authors believe that such an exami-
nation would have reached the same conclusion as the Worth court:
that California community property was not preempted. Regarding
the first Hisquierdo prong, authors assert that Worth's reasoning could
have been strengthened in several ways: (1) by including a more thor-
ough consideration of § 201(d);72 (2) by using the legislative history
to show that implied consent to transfer can overcome the prohibi-
tions of § 201(e);73 and (3) by analogizing such an implied consent
68 See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 3, at 396-401 ("If Section 201(e) means what it
plainly says, state law purporting to divide a divorcing author's copyright interests is
preempted no matter what form the law takes."); see also Polacheck, supra note 3, at
625-26.
69 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 3, at 1065-72. Roberts applies both the "per se"
test of Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New Yor* State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573
(1986), and the "balancing" test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), and
concludes that the application of community property standards as performed in
Worth will "impermissibly interfere(] with interstate transfers of copyright," id. at 1066;
see also Polacheck, supra note 3, at 617.
70 Nayo, supra note 39, at 168.
71 See, e.g., Wong, supra note 5, at 1099-1108.
72 See id. at 1101-02. Wong contends that the argument that § 201(d) did not
contemplate community property dispositions fails, given the other kinds of transfers
envisioned by the section, including transfers at death (by way of wills or intestacy),
bankruptcy, and mortgage foreclosure.
73 See id. at 1102. Specifically, Wong relies on the House Report regarding
§ 201(e) to argue that an author's implied consent, as shown through overt acts, can
overcome § 201(e)'s prohibition of involuntary transfers. The House Report notes,
Traditional legal actions that may involve transfer of ownership, such as
bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage foreclosures, are not within the scope
of... subsection [201(e)]; the authors in such cases have voluntarily con-
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concept to ideas present in other parts of the 1976 Act.74 As to the
second Hisquierdo prong, those writing from a property or family law
perspective see nothing incongruous between community property
principles and the twin goals of copyright; in their opinion, no major
injury is posed to substantial federal interests, and thus, there should
be no preemption. 75
Property and family law commentators have also had little trouble
rationalizing away the practical problems of dual ownership raised by
intellectual property scholars. Some argue that dual ownership is nec-
essary, given the policies underlying community property, regardless
of any inconvenience caused to the creative spouse or third parties.76
These scholars see community property as serving a protective func-
tion, safeguarding the non-author spouse from the other spouse's at-
tempts to hoard financial resources in preparation for divorce. 77
Others contend that the proposed problems are actually not a con-
sented to these legal processes by their overt actions-for example, by filing
for bankruptcy or by hypothecating a copyright.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.G.C.A.N. 5659, 5739.
74 See id. Wongjustifies his belief in an implied consent exception to § 201(e) by
noting that it is consonant with other provisions of the 1976 Act, such as the work-for-
hire doctrine. The 1976 Act defines a work-for-hire as one which is "prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). In
such a case, "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is consid-
ered the author," and as such, is the owner of the copyright. Id. § 201(b).
75 See id. at 1103-07. Wong argues that a community property regime neither
reduces the author's incentives to create nor decreases public welfare derived from
access to the creations. When the author is part of a marital community, Wong ar-
gues, the author's financial goals are identical to those of the marital community.
Wong states furthermore that he believes the personal motivations of creativity and
control over one's own work are similarly maintained in a community property sys-
tem, a conclusion he founds on everyday experience. In confronting the issue of
divorce, Wong analogizes the disputes which could arise over copyrights to those
which already do, regarding other community property assets, and reasons that if the
current community property system can handle those disputes, it can handle copy-
right disputes as well. See id.
76 See id. at 1109-10.
77 See id. In particular, Wong asserts,
There is absolutely no reason to believe that the [non-author] spouse needs
any less protection from abuse simply because the other spouse is a creative
individual-an author-or the property is arguably more complex to com-
mercially exploit-a copyright. Any scheme for management and control of
the copyright must balance the need to effectively commercially exploit the
copyright with the need to protect either spouse from the financial abuse of
the other.
Id. at 1110.
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cern given the current state of community property law.78 They rely
on the so-called "business exception" to the rule of equal manage-
ment under California community property law, which provides that
"a spouse who is operating or managing a business ... that is all or
substantially all community personal property has the primary man-
agement and control of the business."79 Although they acknowledge
the criticism that the "business exception" provision has not yet been
applied in a copyright case, they assert that it would apply in a case
such as Worth and thus eliminate the problem of dual management
while still achieving financial equality for the non-author spouse.80
3. Summary
Given that Worth was the first case to address this tumultuous is-
sue, it is not surprising that the court's decision left many fundamen-
tal questions unanswered. Taken together, the court's opinion and
the conflicting commentary written about it elucidated several key is-
sues that seemed ripe for another case to answer. Was state commu-
nity property law expressly preempted by § 301 of the 1976 Act? If
not, what about preemption under Hisquierdo? If there were no pre-
emption, could the competing ideas of copyright and community
property with regard to ownership be harmonized? It was with this
background that the district court heard Rodrigue.
IV. RODRIGUE v. RODRzVE
A. Facts
As was the case in Worth, the facts of Rodrigue are fairly straightfor-
ward. George Rodrigue, a distinctive painter, has a stable of imagi-
nary characters he has copyrighted and consistently reuses; each of his
works depicts one of these characters in a particular locale.8'
George's two most famous characters are known in the art world as
the "Blue Dog" and 'jolie Blonde."8 2 He created these characters dur-
ing the time of his marriage to Veronica Rodrigue, which existed from
1967 to 1994 under the Louisiana community property regime. 3
During the Rodrigues' 1994 divorce proceedings, Veronica asserted
78 See Nayo, supra note 39, at 170-74.
79 CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (West 1994).
80 See Nayo, supra note 39, at 174-75.
81 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (E.D. La. 1999).
82 See id. Veronica Rodrigue limited her claim so that only her rights in these two
images were at issue. See id. at 536 n.1.
83 See id.
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that Louisiana law and § 201(d) of the 1976 Act granted her equal
rights in the Blue Dog and Jolie Blonde characters; thus, she sought
an accounting in state court for paintings George would create with
them after the marriage. 84 George went to federal court, seeking a
declaratory judgment regarding his ownership of the characters. 85
The state court stayed its proceedings, and in federal court both sides
sought summary judgment.8 6
B. Holding and Rationale
Whereas the Worth court dealt with preemption last, the Rodrigue
district court saw federal preemption as the "threshold issue,"8 7 and it
disregarded Worth's non-preemption rationale in a footnote.88 After
reiterating the federal preference to leave family issues for state fora,
the Rodrigue court briefly examined federal preemption of community
property laws in other contexts. Although it concluded that
"[ciommunity property law has not fared well in preemption battles
before the Supreme Court,"89 citing examples such as Hisquierdo, the
Rodrigue court did note that, despite this general rule, Congress had
legislatively overruled Hisquierdo and other similar cases.90
The Rodrigue court then began its own preemption analysis with
the possibility of express preemption by § 301. After illustrating some
of § 301's limits, the Rodrigue court came to the same result as the
Worth court: it found no express preemption because community
property law "does not necessarily purport to provide rights
'equivalent' to those specified by the [1976] Act."91 However, the Ro-
drigue court wasted no time in qualifying that conclusion. In the very
next sentence of its opinion, it declared that "there are [two] specific
areas of potential conflict between the [1976] Act and Louisiana com-
munity property law that result in preemption." 92
The first "area of potential conflict" according to the Rodrigue
court involved the initial ownership of the copyright, which the court
called "[t] he critical point of friction."93 Because § 201 explicitly vests
84 See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 57 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 356 (Feb.
12, 1999).
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
88 See id. at 537 n.2.
89 Id. at 539.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 540.
92 Id. (emphasis added).
93 Id.
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initial copyright ownership in the author at the moment of creation,
the Rodrigue court felt that any simultaneous vesting of copyright in a
spouse under a community property scheme would "clash head-on"
with federal law.94 Arguing that " [c] ommunity property law may not
defeat the clearly expressed intention of Congress," the court felt satis-
fied that Louisiana community property satisfied both parts of the His-
quierdo test.95 Thus, it quickly concluded that "any community
property ownership provision, such as [the Louisiana statute in ques-
tion] ... , that permits copyright ownership to vest initially in anyone
other than the author is... preempted."96 Thus, Veronica could not
have obtained a stake in the copyrights at the time of initial vesting.
The second "area of potential conflict" analyzed by the court con-
cerned transfer of copyright ownership. Veronica insisted that
§ 201(d) of the 1976 Act should be read as the Worth court had
done-i.e. permitting an "instantaneous" transfer of copyright owner-
ship to the spouse "by operation of law"97-hoping that this "legal
fiction" embraced by the Worth court would circumvent the vesting
problem that the Rodrigue court had just constructed. Although the
Rodrigue court noted the scholarly appreciation of Worth's instantane-
ous transfer idea,98 it did not end its analysis there. Instead, it turned
to the text of § 201 (e). After acknowledging that § 201 (e)'s original
purpose was to fight the oppression of Soviet dissidents,99 the court
relied upon both legislative history °00 and academic scholarship' 0 ' to
94 Id. at 541.
95 Id. (holding that the Louisiana statute "not only literally conflicts with the Act
[satisfying the first part of the Hisquierdo test] ... it does major damage to the
substantial federal interest in providing exclusive rights to authors [satisfying the sec-
ond part of the Hisquierdo test]").
96 Id. In footnotes, the court noted (1) that although the community would not
acquire an interest in the paintings' copyrights, the community would acquire owner-
ship of the paintings themselves, see id. at 541 n.9, and (2) that, as Nimmer had sug-
gested after Worth, such an arrangement was also more logically consistent regarding
surviving spouses. See id. at 541 n.10; see also supra note 57.
97 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994).
98 See Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 541-42 (citing to articles by Nimmer, Patry, and
Wong for the "transfer theory [which] purports to allow the community to obtain
through an infinitesimal passage of time what it is prohibited from doing at the copy-
right's inception").
99 See id. at 542.
100 The court quotes from the House and Senate Reports on § 201(e):
The purpose of this subsection is to reaffirm the basic principle that the
United states copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that au-
thor, and cannot be taken away by any involuntay transfer. It is the intent of
the subsection that.., the governmental body or organization may not en-
force or exercise any rights under this title ....
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conclude that § 201 (e) "prohibits any involuntary transfer by operation
of law." °10 2 Thus, if the proposed instantaneous transfer of copyright
to Veronica was involuntary, it would fail based on copyright law
alone, regardless of any copyright-community property interaction.
This conclusion left the Rodrigue court with only one final issue to
consider: whether the proposed instantaneous transfer was construc-
tively voluntary because of George's knowing and continuing pres-
ence in a community property jurisdiction. 10 3 The court began this
analysis by noting the academic support for such an approach, 0 4 as
well as the fact that the Rodrigues could have opted out of the com-
munity property regime either before or during their marriage. 10 5
However, the court expressed concern that "[t] here is little support in
the body of copyright law for the concept of implied voluntariness." 10 6
The closest analogy to implied consent that the Rodrigue court could
find within the 1976 Act was the work-for-hire doctrine, 10 7 but the
court relied heavily upon William Patry's pre-Worth commentary'0 8 to
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5739) (emphasis added by court)). Also see supra note 73 for Wong's use of
similar material.
101 Here in particular the court cites to 1 NIMMER ON COPrIGHT, supra note 5,
Nevins, supra note 3, and Wong, supra note 5. See Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
102 Id. (emphasis added). The Rodrigue court did consider a counterrationale,
however. It briefly examined one case, In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194
(C.D. Cal. 1990), which had construed § 201(e) in light of its legislative history to
apply only to situations where government bodies were acting in their own interests,
not "in furtherance of private objectives." Id. (quoting In re Peregrine Entertainment,
Ltd., 116 B.R. at 206 n.16). Although the Rodrigue court considered this rationale and
the commentary that followed it to be "somewhat persuasive," it ultimately dismissed
it in favor of § 201 (e)'s "plain language." Id. at 543.
103 See id. at 544-46. The court reasoned,
[T]o conclude that entering into a community property regime constitutes
implied consent to the transfer of copyright ownership would require the
court to ignore a variety of additional issues: the author's actual intent, possi-
ble disincentives to the author to create, inconsistencies that might arise in
other jurisdictions, whether community property states or not, and the
problems that could arise in a mobile society if the author and spouse move
to a community property state.
Id. at 544.
104 In particular, the court cites to 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, Patry,
supra note 2, and Wong, supra note 5. See id. at 543.
105 Both approaches are possible under the Louisiana Code, although opting out
during the marriage would have required judicial action. See LA. Cwy. CODE ANN. art.
2328, 2329 (West 1999).
106 Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
107 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); see also supra note 15.
108 See Patry, supra note 2.
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conclude that such a comparison would fail on several grounds.'0 9
First, the court noted that "Congress itself [has] expressly provided"
the work-for-hire doctrine but did not include any similar provision
regarding community property.110 Second, although "an employee's
acceptance of employment is deemed to be consent to the employer's
ownership," the court decided that marriage vows are not analogous
because work-for-hire is considered a doctrine "of authorship and not
of transfer of rights.""' Finally, the court found that "none of the
theoretical underpinnings of the work-for-hire doctrine are present in
the community property context," because the works are not pro-
duced for or under the control of the nonauthor spouse, there is no
pay involved, and the nonauthor spouse does not bear business costs
and risks as an employer would." 2 In addition, the court could find
no basis in Louisiana law for the idea that one could implicitly consent
to convert separate property to community property."13
Given the dearth of legal support for implied consent, the Ro-
drigue court finally considered the policy implications of recognizing
such a transfer. 1 4 It examined much of the post-Worth criticism,"15
including the idea that the business management rules of community
property states might provide a solution to the copyright-community
property conundrum.1 6 Ultimately, however, the Rodrigue court
agreed with post-Worth intellectual property scholars that the practical
implications of either instantaneous transfer or implied consent
would "inflict[] major damage on the [1976] Act's goals of predict-
ability and certainty," 117 and thus both approaches were preempted
under Hisquierdo.
Having found all of the alternatives for copyright-community
property integration implicitly preempted by the Hisquierdo test, the
Rodrigue court held that federal copyright law preempted Louisiana
community property law. Thus, the court found George Rodrige to
be the sole author and owner of the "Blue Dog" and 'Jolie Blonde"
copyrights and granted him summary judgment against Veronica.
109 See id. at 543-44 (relying on Patry, supra note 2).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 544-45.
115 See id. & 545 n.13.
116 See id. at 545 ("The presence of competing management rules 'threatens chaos
for both the copyright creative and consuming communities.'") (quoting 1 NIMMER
ON COPMRIGHT, supra note 5, § 6A.02 [C]).
117 Id. at 547.
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V. ANALYSIS
Although it had the potential to settle, or at least to address,
many of the difficult questions surrounding the copyright-community
property conflict, the Rodrigue decision may end up creating more
confusion than it resolved. Taken together, Rodrigue, Worth, and the
Worth commentary do suggest that express preemption of community
property law under § 301 of the 1976 Act is an impossibility. This con-
clusion makes sense given the additional interests and extra elements
present in the community property regime.
However, given the differing results in Rodrigue and Worth, the
question of Hisquierdo preemption remains open. Although the Ro-
drigue court was more thorough in considering both sides of the issue
and examined every major piece of scholarship written from both per-
spectives in making its decision, even this logical approach may not be
enough to carry the day before another court. As the commentary
regarding Worth shows, the two Hisquierdo prongs can easily be
manipulated by those on either side of the argument; thus it is un-
clear how another court might apply the Hisquierdo test, and ulti-
mately whether it would find preemption or not.
In addition to leaving the Hisquierdo question unanswered, Ro-
drigue also adds another confounding factor to the equation: Does it
matter, for the purposes of preemption or harmonization, in which
community property state the case is situated? Commentators have
consistently examined the copyright-community property conflict
through the eyes of California law because of the state's prominence,
and no differences are readily apparent in the plain language of the
two states' relevant statutes. 118 But given the differing outcomes in
118 Comparing the community property statutes of California and Louisiana un-
covers no significant differences regarding what constitutes community property, com-
pare CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, all
property . .. acquired by a married person during the marriage . .. is community
property."), with LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (West 1985) (defining community
property as comprising "property acquired during the existence of the... [marriage]
through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse"), the extent of each spouse's
interest, compare CAL. FAm. CODE § 751 (1994) ("The respective interests of the hus-
band and wife in community property... are present, existing and equal interests"),
with LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (1985) ("Each spouse owns a present undivided
one-half interest in the community property"), or the dual rights of ownership and
management invested in both spouses, compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (1994)
("[E]ither spouse has the management and control of the community personal prop-
erty... with like absolute power of disposition ... ."), with LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2346 (1985) ("Each spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of commu-
nity property unless otherwise provided by law"). Note that one difference, which was
not significant to the decisions at hand but could be to a harmonization effort, is that
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Worth and Rodrigue, one must now wonder if differences in the laws of
all of the community property states are significant.
Finally, there is the ultimate question of harmonization: if pre-
emption is not the solution to the copyright-community property con-
flict, can the two sets of law be made to peacefully co-exist? Most
commentators suggest they can, and each proposes solutions to the
problem that require various adjustments to either or both sets of law.
However, scholars and the Rodrigue court itself all independently sug-
gest that this kind of modification effort is best made by the legisla-
ture. And all are correct in this conclusion. Given that copyright vests
federally-created powers and benefits in authors, regardless of their
state of residence, in the end it should be Congress which decides how
the difficulties regarding community property should be resolved.
This answer, however, must come sooner rather than later, as the next
court to consider the issue could easily derive a different answer than
that of either Worth or Rodrigue and leave authors, lawyers, and schol-
ars even more puzzled as to what the law is and what it should be.
the Louisiana code does not have as broad a "business exception" to dual manage-
ment as California does. Compare LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2349-55 (1985 & Supp.
2000), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (1994).
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